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regarding the prepetition activities of the parties in interest in the Chrysler reorganization, and Walter Machnicki,
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Introduction
The Chrysler automobile business was reorganized in 42 days. The company filed its
Chapter 11 petition on April 30, 2009, and the reorganization transaction closed on June 10,
2009. It was “reorganized” in the sense that the operating business assets—including the
Chrysler name and other trademarks—were transferred to a new company that took on many of
the old company‟s liabilities in one form or another. There were substantial exceptions to the
new company‟s assumption of the old company‟s liabilities, however, primarily among
prepetition secured lenders, who received 29 cents on the dollar. The transaction was
accomplished through the aggressive use of 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(b) and (f) in the Southern
District of New York. On expedited direct appeal from the bankruptcy court to the Second
Circuit, the order was summarily affirmed, with an opinion to that effect being issued two
months later.1 When the dissenting creditors petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review of
the Second Circuit‟s decision by certiorari, the Court granted the petition, vacated the judgment
of the Second Circuit, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot,
without issuing an opinion.2 By this time, the Second Circuit‟s Chrysler opinion had already
been used to support confirmation of a similar, but less draconian, section 363 transaction in
the General Motors reorganization case and was being cited in support of similar, fast-track
reorganization-by-sale transactions elsewhere.
This article examines the Chrysler section 363 transaction and the opinions that approved it.
Chrysler may be merely another example of good facts and a crisis making what is perhaps bad
law, which has been a pattern in the evolution of Chapter 11 jurisprudence since the
Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978. The Supreme Court appears to have recognized this in
the Chrysler case and took the opportunity created by the petition for the certiorari to attempt
to wipe the slate clean and re-establish the pre-Chrysler status quo. If this was the Justices‟
intent, it is not clear that they succeeded and, if past events are taken as predictive, more likely
that they did not.
The Supreme Court did the right thing by vacating the Second Circuit opinion, which
endorsed a reorganization process that had broken free of its statutory moorings. However,
vacatur of that opinion is unlikely to erase the effects of the Chrysler case. The opinion
remains on the books, vacated or not, disclosing at least one Second Circuit panel‟s view on
the current state of the Lionel3 363(b) standard, and the bankruptcy court opinion remains good
law, with a strong persuasive, if not strictly binding, effect in the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York.
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I. Prelude to Reorganization: Chrysler and the TARP
In response to the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, Congress passed the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (the Act).4 The Act authorized the U.S. Treasury to
establish a Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) designed to purchase troubled or toxic
assets from American financial institutions.5 While it seemed originally intended as a program
for financial institutions, that designation turned out to be less than concrete, and there has
been some controversy about certain nonfinancial institution recipients of TARP funds. Among
those controversial recipients is Chrysler—not a financial institution in the strict sense
(although Chrysler Acceptance Corporation did serve as Chrysler‟s financing wing) but a
recipient of TARP funds nonetheless. Chrysler received $4 billion in TARP money toward the
end of 2008, which it used to continue operations and carry itself “through the liquidity
crunch”6 that it was then experiencing. It was around this time that Chrysler became dependent
on the U.S. government for fiscal life support, and given Chrysler‟s downward-spiraling
financials, it was not surprising that it would need more. Even with this injection of capital, at
the end of 2008, Chrysler recorded a net loss of $16.8 billion.7 It would be only a matter of
months before Chrysler would declare bankruptcy.
Chrysler‟s acceptance of TARP money resulted in conditions and obligations owed to the
government. As a condition to the loan, Chrysler was to “submit a plan [to the U.S. Treasury]
showing that it was able to achieve and sustain long-term viability, energy efficiency,
rationalization of costs and competitiveness in the U.S. marketplace.”8 In January 2009,
Chrysler entered into a business relationship with Fiat in the hope of forming a strategic
partnership that might allow Chrysler to reemerge as a more viable entity.9 Between the time
that Chrysler entered negotiations with Fiat and its petition date, April 30, 2009, Chrysler
worked to produce a viability plan that would be accepted by the government and allow it to
obtain another loan.10 On February 17, 2009, Chrysler submitted its viability plan to the
government.11 At the same time, it also asked for $5 billion more in TARP funds.12
After examining Chrysler‟s submission, the government concluded that the combination of a
fundamentally disadvantaged operating structure and a limited set of desirable products make
standalone viability unlikely.13 The government stated that it was, however, willing to provide
additional capital to fund a reorganization by partnership with Fiat, setting a fast track for such
a transaction.14 Faced with few viable choices, Chrysler accepted the government‟s terms and
moved forward with Fiat. This also meant “meeting certain other aspects of the Viability Plan
and obtaining additional concessions from key stakeholders” that the Treasury had determined
were preconditions to its further financial support of Chrysler; Chrysler began negotiations
with all the major players concerned.15
Chrysler and Fiat formed a new business entity—New CarCo Acquisition LLC (referred to
as New Chrysler)—that would acquire Chrysler‟s assets and operations and serve as an
“alliance entity” with Fiat.16 Upon closing of the sale of Chrysler to New Chrysler, Fiat would
retain a 35% ownership interest in New Chrysler for its contribution of its vehicle platforms,
technology, and access to its distribution capabilities.17 New Chrysler then began negotiations
with the United Auto Workers Union (UAW) to reach a settlement on Chrysler‟s cash
obligations. On April 26, 2009, New Chrysler and the UAW reached an agreement whereby
the UAW would accept a 55% equity interest in New Chrysler and a $4.587 billion note in
exchange for releasing Chrysler from half of its $10.6 billion obligation.18 This equity interest
and the note would fund a UAW retirement structure for New Chrysler.19 Following this
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settlement, Chrysler‟s last hurdle was to persuade its secured creditors to accept the terms
dictated by the government, which would require them to take a huge loss.
Chrysler‟s secured creditors (hereinafter “creditors”) numbered 46 in all, ranging from large
banks to small hedge funds.20 The total secured debt for all the lenders was $6.9 billion. The
mandated offer to the secured creditors was harsh—for the $6.9 billion Chrysler owed, it
would pay only $2 billion (roughly 29 cents on the dollar).21 The government based this offer
on an assessment by Chrysler‟s valuation expert that $2 billion probably exceeded Chrysler‟s
liquidation value.22 The offer was made to a steering committee of senior creditors, which
served as somewhat of a representative for all the creditors attempting to negotiate with the
government.23 Throughout the negotiations, many of the smaller creditors reportedly felt
excluded from dealing with the government.24 This and the fact that several of the creditors on
the steering committee were recipients of TARP money (while many of the smaller creditors
were not) created a divisive situation between the creditors, as those who had not received
TARP money felt as if those who had were potentially compromised in their negotiations with
the government. The tension only increased when the steering committee accepted the
government‟s 29-cents-on-the-dollar offer after the non-TARP lenders had made it clear that
such terms were unacceptable. It was obvious to everyone that the desired settlement would not
be reached, at least on the government‟s time table, and a bankruptcy filing would be necessary
in order to overcome the opposition of the holdouts.
II. The Chrysler Reorganization Transaction
As should be obvious by this point, the Chrysler bankruptcy case (and the later General
Motors case) involved the most federal government intervention that has ever been present in
cases administered under the Bankruptcy Code. Chrysler‟s debt and equity structure when it
filed its bankruptcy petition can be abstracted as consisting of (1) $6.9 billion in debt to its
senior secured lenders, secured by a blanket security interest in substantially all of its assets;
(2) $2.0 billion owed to affiliates of its equity owners, Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. and
Daimler AG, secured by a second priority blanket security interest in its assets; (3) $4.27
billion to the U.S. Treasury and the Canadian government, secured by a third party priority
security interest in its assets; (4) $10 billion on unsecured debt owed to the United Auto
Workers retiree trust; (5) $5 billion in debts to trade creditors; and (6) an unknown sum owed
to dealers and the public for warranty claims and dealer obligations.25
The governments of the U.S. and Canada provided prepetition loans of approximately $4
billion, debtor in possession (DIP) financing of $5 billion, and exit financing of $6 billion. 26
Under the terms of the transaction, distributions to creditors were as indicated in Table 1, with
some receiving distributions from Old Chrysler, the seller, and some from New Chrysler, the
buyer.
<graphic id=„jblp192_1‟>

The Chrysler transaction has been lauded and vilified by commentators and others.27 Some
embrace the characterization of the transaction adopted by the bankruptcy court and the Second
Circuit. These courts found that the 363 sale transaction was entirely appropriate and normal:
the only purchaser that came to the table paid the estate in cash and an assumption of debt; the
other distributions or obligations that were assumed—the UAW‟s new note and equity stake,
for instance—were part of an independent transaction between the purchaser and the parties
involved.28 Others, collapsing all the separate the transactions into one, view the transaction as
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violating the code‟s priority scheme and as consisting of a de facto plan that stripped the
parties in interest of the protections of 11 U.S.C.A. §1129, the confirmation statute.29
Whichever view one adopts, it was clear to all knowledgeable people who were watching the
process that the transaction was going to be approved at every level, either expressly, silently,
or as a practical matter, by the reviewing courts. In mega-cases during a financial crisis, a
doctrine of necessity often applies and, as Garrison Keillor might put it, “gives people the
strength they need to get up and do what needs to be done.”
III. The Chrysler Opinions
A. The Bankruptcy Court Opinion
The bankruptcy court approved the Chrysler transaction after three days of evidentiary
hearings. After carefully laying out the facts of the case as it saw them, the court turned to the
objections, the first of which was the sub rosa plan objection.30 Although § 363(b) of the Code
can be used to authorize the use, sale, or lease of estate property outside of the ordinary course
of business, many courts have recognized that there must be some limit on this power or else
such transactions would often supplant the plan process and the carefully balanced
confirmation requirements that protect various parties in interest.31 In short, if the proposed
transaction for which approval is sought under section 363 would short-circuit the plan
process, it should not be allowed.32 However, the prohibition is not absolute; these sales may
be approved under the Second Circuit‟s Lionel33 standard, as the Chrysler bankruptcy court
stated, if they are supported by an “articulated business justification” for the use, sale, or lease
of property outside of the ordinary course of business.”34 In Chrysler, the bankruptcy court
found that there was such a justification and overruled these objections.
The Second Circuit‟s Lionel standard is a flexible one that appears to have become looser
over the years. It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit and the Southern District of New
York appear not to have explored or adopted an overlay to the Lionel business judgment test
that would provide more of a structure for the sub rosa plan analysis. Such an overlay was
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in In re Continental Airlines, Inc.35 There, the Fifth Circuit held
that:
[W]hen an objector to a proposed transaction under [section] 363(b) claims that it is being
denied certain protections because approval is sought pursuant to [section] 363(b) instead
of as part of a reorganization plan, the objector must specify exactly what protection is
being denied. If the court concluded that there has in actuality been such a denial, it may
then consider fashioning appropriate protective measures modeled on those which would
attend a reorganization plan.36
In other words, if a sub rosa plan objection is made to a section 363 transaction, under
Continental, it is up to the objector to identify the specific section 1129 confirmation
prohibition or protection that is being denied so that the transaction proponent and the court
can create additional measures to ensure that the prohibition or protection is not bypassed. The
Continental overlay to the basic business judgment standard of Lionel thus provides a way to
tee up and resolve precisely the sub rosa plan objection in a principled fashion and limits the
use of section 363 to instances when plan confirmation protections are not being denied to
parties in interest. Because the Chrysler case was filed in the Southern District of New York
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within the Second Circuit, however, Lionel and similar cases controlled, and the bankruptcy
court applied the controlling precedent.
Finding that the sale could proceed on section 363(b) grounds, the court then turned to
section 363(f), the sale free and clear of claims and interests37 power of the bankruptcy court.
Finding that the first priority secured creditors‟ lending syndicate documents controlled and
that their Administrative Agent and Collateral Trustee under those documents had consented
on their behalf to the sale free and clear, satisfying section 363(f)(1), the court approved the
sale free and clear over the objection of a vocal minority of secured creditors within the
syndicate.38
As part of the approval process, the court also examined the sale process, including the
bidding procedures, and due process concerns given the speed of the approval of the
transaction.39 The court rather summarily found that there were no problems in these areas, a
potentially questionable finding given the size of the transaction at issue, but one that was,
again, made in the spirit of necessity.40 Other objections and requests for clarification were
dispensed with in the opinion‟s final pages.41
B. The Second Circuit Affirmance and Opinion
On June 5, 2009, only five days later, on a direct appeal under 28 U.S.C.A. § 158(d)(1), the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. In doing so, it ruled from the bench at oral
argument, and later issued a short order, promising that an opinion would issue in due course in
support of its ruling. The opinion, authored by Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs, was handed down
two months later.
The Second Circuit opinion adopted the bankruptcy court‟s statement of the factual and
procedural background of the matter and proceeded to group the issues into four categories: (1)
the sub rosa plan objection; (2) the 363(f) objection of the dissenting first priority secured
creditors; (3) the constitutionality of the use of Troubled Asset Relief Funds to finance
Chrysler, as it was not a financial institution; and (4) the ability of the bankruptcy court to see
assets free and clear of the claims of present and future tort claimants.42
As to the first category, dealing with the sub rosa plan objection, the court reiterated the
Lionel standard and that case‟s analysis, both its historical review of the sale standards under
the Bankruptcy Act and the Bankruptcy Code as applied in the Lionel reorganization case
itself. 43 The court characterized the sub rosa plan objection in Chrysler as the transaction
having violated the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code because junior unsecured
creditors, chiefly the UAW pension trust, were receiving value in the overall transaction when
senior secured creditors were not paid in full.44 The court rejected that objection, affirming the
bankruptcy court‟s finding that the junior creditors were not receiving their distribution from
the estate or from the sale but as part of a separate transaction with the purchaser.45 Thus by
characterizing the transaction as having multiple transactions within it and limiting the
application of section 363 to the piece comprised of the sale of assets for $2 billion, there was
no “short circuit” of plan confirmation protections and no violation of the priority scheme.46
This has appeared to some to be disingenuous or at least a very tenuous legal fiction.47 The
court affirmed the bankruptcy court‟s finding of a good business reason for the sale and moved
on to other issues.48
On the issue of the effect of 363(f) on product liability claims, the court divided such claims
into two categories: (1) known, existing claims; and (2) future claims.49 With regard to known,
existing claims, the court adopted the Third Circuit‟s analysis from the Trans World Airlines
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case, finding that section 363(f) sales could be free and clear of both interests and claims,
despite the absence of the word “claims” in the statue.50 As to the future claims, the court
refused to rule decisively, stating that “we decline to delineate the scope of the bankruptcy
court‟s authority to extinguish future claims, until such time as we are presented with an actual
claim for an injury that is caused by Old Chrysler, that occurs after the Sale, and that is
cognizable under state successor liability law.”51
C. The Supreme Court’s Actions
As noted in the introduction to this article, when the objectors sought review by the Supreme
Court, the court granted the petition for certiorari and summarily vacated the Second Circuit‟s
ruling, remanding the case with instructions to dismiss the Second Circuit appeal as moot. 52 28
U.S.C.A. § 2106, the statue that enables it to vacate a lower court judgment when a case is
moot, is flexible, allowing the court to enter an appropriate judgment, decree, or order or to
conduct further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.53 In a case deemed to be
moot, the Court normally vacates the lower court‟s judgment because this “clears the path for
future relitigation of the issues between the parties, preserving the rights of all parties, while
prejudicing none by a decision which was only preliminary.”54 It appears that the Court may
have recognized the Chrysler case as one that was somewhat sui generis, a political necessity,
but one that should not be cited or become part of the fabric of federal bankruptcy law.
IV. What Will Be the Effect of the Chrysler Opinions?
The effect of the Supreme Court‟s disposition is not entirely clear. On the one hand, the
Second Circuit‟s decision has been vacated, and it should have no precedential effect. On the
other hand, it can arguably be cited as “vacated on other grounds” due to the remand to dismiss
the case as moot. This sort of citation brings to mind the continuing vitality of Judge Leif
Clark‟s opinion in Fairchild Aircraft case, dealing with when product liability claims arise,55
which was later vacated at the request of the parties after they had settled.56 Fairchild Aircraft
is often cited and discussed when the issue of the effect of sale or confirmation order on future
claims is addressed, despite being vacated.57 The now-vacated Second Circuit Chrysler opinion
remains an indication of the thinking of at least one Second Circuit panel on two important
issues: (1) the viability and flexibility of the Lionel standard and the absence of any
Continental requirement that objecting parties identify specific plan confirmation prohibitions
or protections that they are being denied so that the bankruptcy court may fashion appropriate
protective measures; and (2) that section 363(f) sales can be free and clear of both interests and
claims.
What is the effect of the bankruptcy court opinion that was not vacated? Some might argue
that, as an opinion of a trial court, it has no precedential value and is binding no one, not even
the court and judge that issued it. However, it has already been used as a precedent, most
notably in the General Motors Chapter 11 case, which also involved a fast-paced 363 sale of
substantially all the assets of the company.58 In the General Motors case, the bankruptcy court
noted that:
Bankruptcy Courts in this Circuit decide issues of the type now before the Court under
binding decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
each of which (particularly the later) has spoken to the issues here. Bankruptcy courts
look to other bankruptcy court decisions, which, in this District and elsewhere, have dealt
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with very similar facts. While an opinion of one bankruptcy judge in this District is not,
strictly speaking, binding on another, it is the practice of this Court to grant great respect
to earlier bankruptcy court precedents in this District, particularly since they frequently
address issues that have not been addressed at the Circuit level.59
In support of that statement, the General Motors court cited to the Adelphia Communications
case, which it quoted:
This Court has been on record for many years as having held that the interests of
predictability in this District are of great importance, and that where there is no
controlling Second Circuit authority, it follows the decisions of other bankruptcy judges in
this district in the absence of clear error.60
Thus, despite the Second Circuit‟s opinion being vacated by the Supreme Court, the
bankruptcy court‟s opinion in Chrysler (and now General Motors as well) constitutes what
sounds like a very strong form of persuasive authority in the Southern District of New York.
The Second Circuit opinion remains available for reading, including its endorsement of the
narrow view of the section 363 transaction that was approved in Chrysler and its endorsement
of the practice of ignoring the simultaneous interrelated deals between new Chrysler and some,
but not all, of the stakeholders in old Chrysler for purposes of the section 363 analysis. A bell
cannot be unrung.
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